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Decisionmaking for the Incompetent
Terminally Ill Patient: A Compromise in a
Solution Eliminates a Compromise of Patients' Rights
State courts and legislatures continue to grapple with the problem of
who may make decisions about discontinuing care for incompetent ter-
minally ill patients. The multiple issues raised by the question "Who
decides?," which include medical, legal, ethical, and social considerations,
have resulted in a tug of war between medical and legal forums.
Legislative action has been limited in this area,' and the answers pro-
posed by state courts lack uniformity.
This note focuses on the continuing battle between medical and judicial
forums in those jurisdictions where the legislature has not acted. Courts
confronting the question in the past have generally produced two different
basic solutions. Some courts have opted against judicialization, leaving
the decision of discontinuing care for incompetent terminally ill patients
up to their doctors and families. Other courts think that more judicial
control over the decisionmaking process is desirable. The advantages and
' California was the first state to enact a natural death law and was followed by seven
other states. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE SS 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1978); ARK. STAT.
ANN. SS 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1977); IDAHO CODE SS 39-4501 to -4508 (Supp. 1978); NEv. REv.
STAT. SS 449.540-.690 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-1 to -11 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. SS 90-320
to -322 (Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. SS 97.050-.090 (1970); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
tit. 4590h, SS 1-11 (Vernon Supp. 1978). See also Note, The California Natural Death Act:
An Empirical Study of Physicians' Practices, 31 STAN. L. REV. 913, 917 & n.20 (1979). The
"natural death" laws were designed to increase a patient's legal control of his treatment
decisions and eliminate doctors' fear of liability for complying with a patient's wish to ter-
minate treatment. Id. at 917.
A popular legislative alternative is the "living will," which is an "instrument executed
with the formalities necessary for a valid will, expressing an intention to refuse treatment
and release medical personnel from all liability should the declarant become terminally
ill and incapable of asserting the right to refuse treatment." Ufford, Brain Death/Termina-
lion of Heroic Efforts to Save Life-Who Decides?, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 225,247 (1980). There
are variations of the broadly defined "living will," see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
SS 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1978), yet living wills are generally not legally enforceable without
legislation. See Note, supra, at 917. Living wills frequently prove to be insufficient because
of the complexity of the terms included in the legislative guidelines. "Terminal condition,"
"life-sustaining procedures," and "artificial means" are only a few of the extremely com-
plex phrases that provoke confusion and disagreement over their meanings. Id. at 920-21.
Other flaws are that living wills cannot apply to minors and that sample forms lead pa-
tients to believe they have fewer rights than they do. Ufford, supra, at 248. Nevertheless,
legislation provides an advantage by allowing a person to voice his decision, when there
is no doubt of his competency, as to his ultimate treatment if he becomes incompetent
and terminally ill. Living wills would thus release a physician from liability and remove
the burden of decisionmaking from others. Due to the limited extent of legislative action,
however, legislative solutions to the problem of who decides remain inadequate and are
not considered extensively in this note.
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disadvantages of each of these approaches will be explored in light of
both the rights of the incompetent terminally ill patient and the interests
of families, society, and the medical profession.
This note argues that the patient's interests are foremost and other
considerations, while relevant, are secondary. Consequently, the decision-
maker must be able to represent fully the interests of the patient. The
solutions offered by existing court decisions do not deal clearly with these
concerns. Yet, some guidance as to when the medical forum is an inade-
quate decisionmaker and when intervention by the legal system is needed
to insure the protection of the rights of an incompetent terminally ill pa-
tient has been developed recently through Massachusetts decisions deal-
ing with this issue.
This note proposes that a compromise solution is best suited to resolve
the problem. An examination of previous court decisions and potential
alternatives yields an answer involving both the medical and judicial
forums. When the patient's interests are clearly being represented, the
proper decisionmaker is the medical forum. If any conflicts arise and the
decision concerning the patient's treatment is not unanimously accepted,
then judicial intervention is necessary.
THE COMPETING FORUMS
The subject of facilitated death has been difficult for society to deal
with. The questions raised have been couched in different forms ranging
from "when life-prolonging technology should be used and when it should
be withdrawn"2 to "not how death can be prevented, but how much ef-
fort, if any, should be made to postpone the moment of death."' Crucial
to the subject has been the question "Who should represent the interest
of the incompetent terminally ill patient in the decision to withhold life-
prolonging treatment?" The New Jersey case of In re Quinlan,4 favoring
medical decisionmaking, and the Massachusetts case of Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz5 and its progeny,6 favoring judicial
decisionmaking, illustrate the two main conflicting answers.
In re Quinlan: The Medical Forum as Decisionmaker
Unknown causes reduced twenty-one-year-old Karen Quinlan to a
2 Ufford, supra note 1, at 236-37.
Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz: Decision Making for the Terminally Ill In-
competent, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 367, 368 (1979).
137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (Ch. Div. 1975), modified and remanded, 70 N.J.
10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
6 In re Spring, __ Mass. -, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App.
Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978); Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
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"'chronic persistent vegetative state.'- 7 No known cure for her condition
existed. Karen's father wished to be appointed guardian for the person
and property of his daughter and sought the power to authorize the discon-
tinuance of all extraordinary procedures required to sustain her vital
processes After such authorization was denied by the New Jersey
Superior Court, based on the patient's right of privacy, the New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed and announced the method for determining who
should decide whether extraordinary care should be provided:
Upon the concurrence of the guardian and family of Karen, should
the responsible attending physicians conclude that there is no
reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging from her present com-
atose condition to a cognitive, sapient state and that the life-support
apparatus now being administered to Karen should be discontinued,
they shall consult with the hospital "Ethics Committee" or like body
of the institution in which Karen is then hospitalized. If that con-
sultative body agrees that there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's
ever emerging from her present comatose condition to a cognitive,
sapient state, the present life-support system may be withdrawn and
said action shall be without any civil or criminal liability therefor on
the part of any participant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or
others.9
The Quinlan case recognized the conflict existing between the medical
and judicial forums as decisionmakers. This conflict prompted the New
Jersey Supreme Court to note Judge Muir's comments in the lower court
questioning what justification could exist for removing the responsibility
for care of a patient from the medical profession to the judiciary. ° Quinlan
asserted that the patient's doctors are the proper decisionmakers:
We glean from the record here that physicians distinguish between
curing the ill and comforting and easing the dying; that they refuse
to treat the curable as if they were dying or ought to die, and that
they have sometimes refused to treat the hopeless and dying as if
they were curable."
The decision did not call for any change in longstanding medical practice,
except possibly for the routine involvement of an ethics committee."
7 70 N.J. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654 (quoting expert witnesses). One of the experts defined
this to be the state of a "subject who remains with the capacity to maintain the vegetative
parts of neurological function but who ... no longer has any cognitive function." Id.
Id. at 18, 355 A.2d at 651.
Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671 (footnote omitted).
,' Id. at 44,355 A.2d at 665 (quoting In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. at 259, 348 A.2d at 818).
Id. at 47, 355 A.2d at 667.
"Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 233,234 (1978).
Quinlan suggested that after a concurrence by the attending physician and family, an ethics
committee should be consulted. The traditional view of the family has developed into a
general belief held by society that the family's wishes should always be taken into con-
sideration. Traditionally, "[w]hen dying was a personal at-home occurrence, the law did
not intervene, with limited exceptions, to question the family's wisdom or right to treat
the dying as it deemed best." Note, No-Code Orders vs. Resuscitatio=" The Decision to Withhold
f982]
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Saikewicz and Progeny: Toward Judicial Decisionmaking
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz: Setting the Pace
A year after Quinlan, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
rejected the medical forum approach in Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz.3 A succession of decisions in the Massachusetts courts
have since expanded and clarified Saikewicz, outlining guidelines for the
utilization of the judicial forum.
Saikewicz was an incompetent with an incurable illness, undergoing
life-prolonging treatment. In deciding whether to allow discontinuation
of treatment, the court recognized that one of the main issues it had to
confront was what particular procedures are necessary to insure the rights
of the incompetent. 4 The court held that incompetent patients have the
same rights as competent ones and that those rights include declining
medical treatment under certain circumstances. 5 It was further held that
the probate court should, upon petition, decide whether a patient is men-
tally incompetent under state law and, if so, should appoint a guardian
to present arguments in favor of prolonging the patient's life by treat-
ment. An ethics committee could be consulted, but was not required. 6
Saikewicz was a sweeping decision that called for routine judicializa-
tion of cases dealing with incompetent terminally ill persons. The court
did not view the judicial resolution "as constituting a 'gratuitous encroach-
ment' on the domain of medical expertise. Rather, such questions of life
Life-Prolonging Treatment from the Terminally Ill, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 139, 168 (1979). The
family should not be removed from the decisionmaking process; it has a special connection
with the patient that should be considered. With commendable motives, a family may urge
a certain decision, keeping the patient's welfare foremost in its mind. Yet while there are
certain advantages when a family has the decisionmaking responsibility, very few would
feel the family should have sole authority. The best interests of others are not always
within the interests of a family, and the family can be a threat to the patient's welfare.
One commentator has noted that the interests of surviving family members adverse to
those of the patient can provide a very perplexing and controversial element in the han-
dling of dying, incompetent patients. Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy, and the Handling of Incompe-
tent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 243,260 (1977). Opposing interests can be taken into
consideration and weighed against other factors, but the law should keep the patient's
rights paramount. Many unanswered questions add to the situation's difficulty: What if
the patient's family does not want to be involved? Who constitutes the patient's family?
What if the family disagree among themselves? What if their motives are less than com-
mendable, such as a desire to save expense or speed up an inheritance? What if the physi-
cian effectively controls the family's decision through selective disclosure of information
or through his manner? Note, supra, at 168. For a discussion of ethics committees, see
notes 88-100 & accompanying text infra.
" 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
1 Id. at 737, 370 N.E.2d at 423. Two other issues confronted by the court were what
rights are generally possessed by persons in this area and how an incompetent person
is to be afforded the status in law of a competent person. Id.
'5 Id. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
Id. at 756-58, 370 N.E.2d at 433-34.
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and death ... require the process of detached but passionate investiga-
tion and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of
government was created."17 A subjective test"8 was seen as the answer,
the goal of which was to determine accurately the wants and needs of
the individual involved. 9
In re Dinnerstein: Applying Saikewicz
In In re Dinnerstein,0 a lower court narrowly interpreted the holding
of Saikewiez by upholding for the first time, with limitations, the validity
of a no-code order entered without prior judicial approval."' Dinnerstein's
attending physician recommended that resuscitation efforts not be under-
taken, and the family concurred with the decision. The doctor wanted
to enter a no-code order, which is entered in a patient's medical record
and "instructs the nursing staff, as part of the attending physician's ongo-
ing instructions to the nursing staff for the care of the patient, not to
summon the code team in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest."'
Specifically, the court held that, under the circumstances, it was lawful
not to resuscitate unless a court had previously determined that resuscita-
tion was in the patient's best interests. The court recognized that a con-
trary holding would have devastating results:
The practical results of such a reading would, of course, be very far
reaching, since it is obvious on reflection that cardiac or respiratory
arrest will signal the arrival of death for the overwhelming majority
of persons whose lives are terminated by illness or old age; indeed,
they are part of the normal act of death.'
Dinnerstein interpreted Saikewicz as requiring prior court approval for
withholding or withdrawing treatment only when an incompetent person
is suffering from a treatable or curable condition and some individual
responsible for the care of that incompetent does not believe that such
treatment should be rendered.' The opinion may best be viewed as refus-
ing to require resuscitative procedures that would operate as "a pointless,
even cruel, prolongation of the act of dying."2
Despite the seeming clarity of the rationale underlying the decision,
' Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
18 For a description of the subjective test, which requires a substitute judgment, see
text accompanying notes 119-22 infra.
IS 373 Mass. at 750 & n.15, 370 N.E.2d at 430 & n.15.
6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978).
21 Note, supra note 12, at 158.
6 Mass. App. Ct. at 469 n.3, 380 N.E.2d at 136 n.3. See generally Rabkin, Gillerman
& Rice, Orders Not to Resuscitate, 295 NEw ENG. J. MED. 364 (1976).
6 Mass. App. Ct. at 470, 380 N.E.2d at 136.
2 Glantz, Post-Saikewicz Judicial Actions Clarify the Rights of Patients and Families,
MEDICOLEGAL NEWS, Winter 1978, at 10.
6 Mass. App. Ct. at 471, 380 N.E.2d at 137 (footnote omitted).
19821
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many legal issues were still left unsettled after Dinnerstein. The deci-
sion did not answer whether a no-code order could be used in situations
where the patient was not permanently incompetent, a guardian had not
been appointed, or third party interests were involved.26 The court also
failed to discuss the propriety of using a no-code order where the pa-
tient's family and physician were not in agreement as to treatment, and
where the disease might be terminal, but death not imminent.'
In re Spring: Expanding Saikewicz
A recent Massachusetts case, In re Spring,' both clarified and clouded
matters dealt with previously. Spring was an incompetent with perma-
nent and irreversible senility and kidney disease. He experienced unplea-
sant side effects from the treatment he was receiving, and his family
believed that if he were competent, he would request withdrawal of the
treatment.
Reaffirming Saikewicz, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
recognized the right of an incompetent to refuse medical treatments and
applied a substitute judgment standard -a standard requiring the court
to decide as it thinks the incompetent would decide if he were competent.'
The court rejected the suggestion that Saikewicz always requires prior
court approval before withholding life-prolonging treatment from an in-
competent patient.3 1 Spring reiterated the procedures outlined in Saikewicz
and suggested "a variety of circumstances to be taken into account in
deciding whether ... prior court [approval is necessary] with respect to
the treatment of an incompetent patient."3 The court listed the following
circumstances:
the extent of impairment of the patient's mental faculties, whether
the patient is in the custody of a State institution, the prognosis
without the proposed treatment, the prognosis with the proposed treat-
Note, supra note 12, at 159-60.
27 Id.
In re Spring, - Mass. - , 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
Id "[A] competent person has a general right to refuse medical treatment in appropriate
circumstances, to be determined by balancing the individual interest against countervail-
ing State interests, particularly the State interest in the preservation of life. In striking
that balance, account is to be taken of the prognosis and of the magnitude of the proposed
invasion. The same right is to be extended to an incompetent person, to be exercised through
a 'substituted judgment' on his behalf." Id. at -, 405 N.E.2d at 119.
See notes 118-23 & accompanying text infra.
"' See - Mass. at - 405 N.E.2d at 120-22. Some persons had said that Saikewicz
required prior judicial approval "even in cases of 'brain death.'" - Mass. at - , 405
N.E.2d at 119 (citing Annas, supra note 3, at 387). The court observed that neither Spring
nor Saikewicz involved the legality of action taken without judicial authority, but that "[t]here
is no legal basis for a duty to administer medical treatment after death," including brain
death. - Mass. at - , 405 N.E.2d at 119.
" - Mass. at -, 405 N.E.2d at 120-21.
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ment, the complexity, risk and novelty of the proposed treatment,
its possible side effects, the patient's level of understanding and prob-
able reaction, the urgency of decision, the consent of the patient,
spouse, or guardian, the good faith of those who participate in the
decision, the clarity of professional opinion as to what is good medical
practice, the interests of third persons, and the administrative re-
quirements of any institution involved.
Although the court listed specific items to be considered, it was noncom-
mittal about which combination of circumstances might render prior court
approval necessary.'
The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Spring left open the possibility
that in certain cases no prior judicial approval may be needed to withdraw
life-prolonging treatment from a terminally ill patient. The court's
guidelines are unclear, however, because they are so general, and little
direction can be gleaned from the court's discussion of prior Massachusetts
decisions. Spring only mentioned Dinnerstein in passing, saying that it
was consistent with the holding in Saikewiez. 5 Nevertheless, the Spring
court felt strongly that legal questions dealing with whether treatment
should be withheld should not be delegated to a private person or group
if they have been properly presented to a court. 8 The open-ended quality
of the Spring opinion therefore allows considerable flexibility in decision-
making procedures for withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment. Such flex-
ibility, however, is gained only at the cost of added ambiguity. While physi-
cians and families are allowed a degree of freedom from judicial involve-
ment, the ultimate authority of the legal system to decide is still very
much present.
Eichner v. Dillon: Reshaping Saikewicz
New York chose to follow Saikewicz' approach by favoring a judicial
forum, but required stricter procedures than Massachusetts in the 1980
case of Eichner v. Dillon.' There the court outlined a procedure to follow
Id. at - , 405 N.E.2d at 121.
Id. On the specific facts presented in In re Spring, the court held that treatment should
be withheld. Id. at ___, 405 N.E.2d at 123. The court expressed a desire that cases should
be expedited, as there are serious costs produced by a lack of finality. I& at ___ 405
N.E.2d at 122. The court suggested some possible routes to achieve expedition. "The pro-
bate judge may expedite the subsequent hearing, and may report the case to the Appeals
Court or may report a question arising on an interlocutory order.... If there are substan-
tial reasons ... a joint application for direct appellate review by this court may be ap-
propriate .... If other remedies fail, an application may be made to a single justice of
this court to exercise our power of general superintendence:' Id. at __, 405 N.E.2d at 123-24.
Id. at _, 405 N.E.2d at 120.
Id. at -' 405 N.E.2d at 122.
73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980). Brother Joseph Fox, an 83-year-old member
of the Roman Catholic Order of the Society of Mary, was in an "irreversible and perma-
nent vegetative coma:' Id. at 442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 528. Eichner, Fox's guardian, instituted
1982]
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whenever the withdrawal of extraordinary life-sustaining measures from
the incompetent terminally ill patient is proposed. First, the attending
physician must certify that the patient is terminally ill and in an irrever-
sible, chronic, or permanent vegetative coma, and that the prospects of
his regaining cognitive brain function are extremely remote. Second, the
person to whom the certification is made must present the prognosis to
an appropriate hospital committee, which must then reject or accept the
proposal. If there is no existing committee, then one must be appointed
by the hospital's chief administrative officer, with confirmation of the prog-
nosis requiring a majority vote. After confirmation by the committee, a
proceeding may be commenced for the granting of permission to have
the life-sustaining measures withdrawn.' The court will appoint a guard-
ian to represent the patient in such a proceeding. 9 The Eichner court
recognized that the outlined procedures might appear time-consuming,
but felt that such a procedure was necessary to protect the rights of the
incompetent.4" The court decided that "the societal interests to be
safeguarded are so great that the courts have no choice but to intervene
and examine each case on an individual, patient-to-patient basis.""1
Eichner does not allow any discretion in the allocation of decisionmaking
powers and, as a result, rejects the Quinlan medical forum approach as
firmly as the Massachusetts decisions.42
THE PATIENT'S RIGHTS
Representing an incompetent terminally ill person's rights should be
the chief concern in making decisions about his continued treatment, and
a test balancing this paramount concern against competing interests may
be employed to protect the patient's rights.4" There is strong support for
the idea that a person's right of choice and recognition of his inherent
proceedings to have Brother Fox declared incompetent, and to obtain a judicial order for
the withdrawal of the respirator. Eichner testified that were Fox competent, he would
not want any of the extraordinary procedures, and he had, in fact, expressed this desire.
Id. at 439-40, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
Id. at 476-77, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 550. If the court concluded that the treatment should
be withdrawn, then no participant would be subject to criminal or civil liability.
Id. at 477, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
Id. at 477, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 551. See Paris, Court Intervention and the Diminution of
Patient's Rights: The Case of Brother Joseph Fox, 303 NEw ENG. J. MED. 876,877 (1980). Judge
Mollen, writing for the majority, acknowledged that any decision would be easier if the
patient had written a "living will" or had clearly expressed his desires, as Brother Fox
had, before becoming incompetent.
41 Id. at 476, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 550 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
42 Id. at 474-75, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 549. For other examples of cases rejecting the Quinlan
approach, see In re Benjamin C., No. J914419 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Cal. Feb.
15, 1979); Saad v. Wesley Medical Center, No. 77C 460 (Kan. 18th Jud. Dist. Feb. 25, 1977).
See also Ufford, supra note 1, at 254, 258; 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 49 (1980).
3 See Note, supra note 1, at 914 & n.3.
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dignity and value should have high priority. The foundation of such an
idea is deeply imbedded in our history:
The notion that a person is an autonomous being with inherent dig-
nity and value and whose life and actions are -to the greatest extent
compatible with the rights of others-to be controlled by his own
choices, has been a dominant theme in the philosophy and politics of
Western Civilization since the Enlightenment."
The court in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz 5
stated that "[tlhere is implicit recognition in the law ... that a person
has a strong interest in being free from nonconsensual invasion of his
bodily integrity."4 6 While there is no legally recognized "right to die,"
4 7
a competent adult may nevertheless refuse life-sustaining treatment, even
if the result of a recognition of this right will be to induce or hasten death."
The importance of protecting a patient's dignity and privacy has also been
recognized by legislation. 9
Both In re Quinlane and Saikewicz found that a patient's rights were
supported by the Constitution. "Of even broader import [than the implicit
recognition that a person should be free from nonconsensual invasion],
but arising from the same regard for human dignity and self-determination,
is the unwritten constitutional right of privacy found in the penumbra
of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights."'" This right of privacy is broad
enough to include a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under
" Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 48 & n.2 (1976). Accord, Kant, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE META-
PHYSICS OF MORALS IN PROBLEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 2336 (2d ed. P. Taylor 1972); C. Fried,
AN ANATOMY OF VALUES, 34-39, 138 (1970). See also C. Fried, MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION,
67-78, 94-104 (1974); R. Nozick, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
46 Id. at 738-39, 370 N.E.2d at 424. See Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252
(1891); Thibault v. Lalumiere, 318 Mass. 72, 60 N.E.2d 349 (1945); Commonwealth v. Clark,
43 Mass. (2 Met.) 23 (1840). "In short, the law recognizes the individual interest in preserv-
ing 'the inviolability of his person.'" 373 Mass. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424 (quoting Pratt
v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (1905), affd, 224 11. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906)). "Courts have
long recognized the principle that every human being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done with his body." Note, supra note 1, at 913 & n.3
(quoting Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914));
Accord, Cantebury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
" Kindregan, The Court as a Forum for Life and Death Decisions: Reflections on Pro-
cedures for Substituted Consent, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 919,921 (1-977). See In re Osborne, 294
A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); Lane v. Can-
dura, 78 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 588, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re Melldeo, 88 Misc. 2d
974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (1973).
" Kindregan, supra note 47, at 921.
" See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 7186 (West Supp. 1978).
137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (Ch. Div. 1975), rev'd, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
51 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 759, 370 N.E.2d
at 425 (1977). The court traced the line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that has tied the
right to control over one's body to a fundamental right of privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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certain circumstances,- but complications arise when a person is incapable
of voicing his choice as to treatment.5 Recent cases, however, have ex-
tended the right to refuse treatment to comatose and incompetent
patients." The fact of incompetency alone should not rob an individual
of his rights.,5 The Saikewicz court noted: "We think that principles of
equality and respect for all individuals require the conclusion that a choice
exists .... The recognition of that right must extend to the case of an
incompetent, as well as a competent, patient because the value of human
dignity extends to both."56 When life has become a miserable physical
burden to a patient who has no hope of recovery, that patient, even though
incompetent, should not have to endure further treatment when his com-
petent counterpart has the right to say "enough."57 "'[ilt is the individual
who is the subject of a medical decision who has the final say and ... this
must necessarily be so in a system of government which gives the greatest
possible protection to the individual in the furtherance of his own
desires.' ""
Even when the state has a competing interest, the courts have given
primary consideration to the patient's rights. A balancing test is applied
to weigh the patient's right to individual autonomy against the claimed
interests of the state.' Courts have found that the state's interests weaken
and the individual's right to privacy grows "as the degree of bodily inva-
sion increases and the prognosis dims."' Such regard for an incompetent's
rights is a necessary counterpart to the traditionally high value assigned
to any person's dignity and privacy. A utilitarian approach protecting
society alone would have disastrous results for individuals, as the applica-
tion of this philosophy would rarely protect the individual. "The good
of one individual is seldom strong enough to withstand the combined utility
of many. Thus scarce resources, including personal rights and even life,
70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
A person is disqualified from giving his consent if he is a minor, unconscious, or men-
tally incapable. Kindregan, supra note 47, at 922 & nn.13-15.
See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,370 N.E.2d
417 (1977); Lane v. Candura, 78 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 588, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In
re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). But see Collins v. David, 44 Misc. 2d 622, 254
N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
See note 56 infra.
373 Mass. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at 427. "The trend in the law has been to give incompe-
tent persons the same rights as other individuals." Id. at 747, 370 N.E.2d at 428 (citing
Boyd v. Registrars of Voters of Belchertown, 368 Mass. 631, 334 N.E.2d 629 (1975). See
generally Robertson, supra note 44, at 62-63.
57 Note, supra note 12, at 151 n.65.
Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 455, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 536 (App. Div. 1980) (quoting
Erikson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962)).
11 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. These claimed interests "are essentially
the preservation and sanctity of human life and defense of the right of the physician to
administer medical treatment according to his best judgment." Id.
Id at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
[Vol. 57:325
PATIENTS' RIGHTS
may be allocated on the basis of social worth criteria."'" The need to
preserve a person's rights has thus properly been viewed by the courts
to be of paramount concern in the step-by-step decision of when to ter-
minate treatment.
The recognition of the right of an incompetent person to decline or
continue treatment requires an examination of how such a right may be
most effectively exercised, so as to afford the incompetent patient the
fullest expression of his individual preferences and desires.2 Reconciling
the claims of both the medical and legal forums provides a solution that
offers the most adequate protection for the rights of the incompetent
patient.
THE MEDICAL FORUM
The essence of the question "Who decides?" is the insurance of ade-
quate representation and protection of the patient's rights. As in Quinlan,
many feel that the physician is best qualified to serve such interests.,3
A physician is already obligated to keep his patient's interests paramount,6
and one commentator has remarked that a doctor is also "obligated to
confer with his patients or their next of kin, to keep them fully informed,
and to be guided by their wishes."" Physicians are also obligated by their
traditional responsibilities to decide whether to treat someone, "which
in effect will determine whether, and for how long, and in what condition
the patient is likely to live or die. '66 Trust is the essence of the relation-
ship between the physician and the patient. Both patients and their
families rely heavily on the professional judgment of their doctor.6 7
Emergency situations often arise, and a doctor may be forced to make
a decision concerning treatment without advance consultation with the
patient or his family." Many medical questions of a highly technical nature
may arise which cannot be fully appreciated or understood by lay persons.6 9
Such considerations all favor the physician as the decisionmaker. Fur-
ther, one commentator has argued that because of the fiduciary relation-
" Robertson, supra note 44, at 52 & n.20. See Alexander, Medical Science Under Dic-
tatorship, 241 NEw ENG. J. MED. 39 (1949).
62 373 Mass. at 747, 370 N.E.2d at 428.
" "Medical paternalism" is a term often used to describe the proposition that physi-
cians should be allowed to make their own decisions concerning the discontinuation of treat-
ment for incompetent terminally ill patients. See, e.g., Buchanan, Medical Paternalism, 7
PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 370 (1978).





" Id. at 237.
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ship between a doctor and a patient, a doctor is obligated to make deci-
sions for his patients."
Recent polls indicate that a high percentage of medical practitioners
are inclined to practice passive euthanasia on "hopelessly ill patients."7 1
This suggests a duty felt by many physicians that the physician's role
is not just to heal but also to recognize the patient's right to die. One
critic of judicial intervention has stated:
[Slociety and the law must recognize that physicians have been par-
ticularly trained with a technical competence that judges do not have
and have learned to distinguish between "curing the ill and comfort-
ing the dying." Judicial review should not be necessary to confirm
a physiological diagnosis that a patient is dying.2
Only a small chance of abuse by physicians exists,73 and no recent research
has reported lawsuits charging a doctor with civil or criminal liability
for failure to treat a terminally ill patient.74
The view that physicians are the ideal decisionmakers is an over-
simplification of the problem. Each patient will attach a different value
to the possible benefits and costs that will lead him to his individual
decision.
A decision to end the life of a terminally ill patient is no more a
mere "medical question" to be decided by doctors than a decision to
declare war is a mere "military question" to be decided by generals....
[T]here is [a] decision which must be made before treatment can begin
which can be made only by the patient himself:... What course of
treatment offers me the chances of benefit that I wish at risks that
I am willing to accept? 5
As even Quinlan recognized, medical custom is persuasive authority, but
it is never controlling as only courts can determine "human values and
rights."'76 Physicians can be influenced or guided by self-interest or self-
protection, "which would inhibit their independent medical judgments for
the well-being of their dying patients."77 The possibility of malpractice
suits and the threat of liability remain forever a shadow at physicians'
sides.78 A doctor who is overly concerned with the legal ramifications of
his actions may neglect to treat his patient's interests as primary
considerations.
70 Relman, supra note 12, at 237.
"' Note, supra note 1, at 915 & n.5. See Cantor, Law and the Termination of an Incompe-
tent Patient's Life Preserving Care, in THE DILEMMAS OF EUTHANASIA (J. Behnke & S. Bok
eds. 1975).
' Note, supra note 12, at 165.
73 Id.
74 Id.
5 Baron, Medical Paternalism & The Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr. Relman, 4 Am. J.L.
& MED. 337, 340 (1979).
76 70 N.J. at 44, 355 A.2d at 665.
Id. at 43, 355 A.2d at 665.7' Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 458, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 535 (1980). For a discussion
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Empirical data also suggest that many doctors are not in fact particu-
larly adept at judging what their patients want.79 One commentator has
argued that doctors cannot make rational decisions for patients despite
the "paternalistic" relationship which may exist." He explained that in
order to respect the patient's wishes, the doctor would have to have a
profound knowledge of the patient's life history, personality, beliefs, aspira-
tions, and capacity to cope, all of which is realistically impossible under
the present conditions of highly impersonal specialist medical practice.'
Doctors are human, and sometimes "the motivation and technical skills
of physicians lead them to see hope and health as ends in themselves,"' 2
which results in some not being "able to accept as rational a patient's
desire to know about and resign himself to impending death or to refuse
treatment whose benefits the doctor believes outweigh concomitant
risks."
Furthermore, although some medical decisions are of a technical nature,
studies have indicated that patients do not generally believe they have
delegated decisionmaking power to their doctors by virtue of the physician-
patient relationship.' Moreover, as one commentator noted:
Advocates of medical paternalism have not provided hard evidence
for the sweeping generalization that decisions concerning life-
prolonging treatment for terminally-ill patients typically or even fre-
quently require technical medical knowledge beyond the ken of the
patients' families. Yet only if such a generalization were firmly
established would the medical paternalistic model of decision-making
be plausible, for that model takes as paradigmatic the case in which
the physician alone is able to understand what is in the patient's best
interest.'
No concrete safeguards are provided as an assurance that the doctor can
or will make a decision that will better represent the patient's interests
than a decision by the family.
The flexibility offered by physicians as decisionmakers may thus be
viewed as a liability as well as an asset. One crucial problem with the
of the question of civil and criminal liability in the treatment of dying patients, see, e.g.,
Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A Prosecutorial View of the Quinlan Case, 30 RUTGERS
L. REV. 304 (1977); Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L. REV. 999 (1967); Foreman, ThePhysi-
cian's Criminal Liability for the Practice of Euthanasia, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 54 (1975); Ken-
nedy, The Legal Effect of Requests by the Terminally Ill and Aged Not to Receive Further
Treatment from Doctors, 1976 CRIM. L. REV. 217; Steele & Hill, A Plea For a Legal Right to
Die, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 328 (1976).
,' Baron, supra note 75, at 343-44.
80 Buchanan, Medical Paternalism, supra note 63, at 381-82.
81 Id.
Baron, supra note 75, at 345.
83Id.
1, Id. (citing Reynolds, No News is Bad News: Patients' Views about Communication, 1
BRIT. MED. J. 1673, 1674 (1978)).
's Buchanan, Medical Paternalism or Legal Imperialism: Not the Only Alternatives for
Handling Saikewicz-type Cases, 5 Am. J.L. & MED. 97, 101 (1979).
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medical forum as a decisionmaker is that it lacks essential safeguards
found in the judicial forum. It has been stated that:
There are no institutional frameworks that require doctors to develop
principles of decison making that are consistent from one doctor to
another and from one time to another. As a result, few doctors have
worked out principles of decision making that will survive even the
most rudimentary criticism, and decisions which are made on the same
set of facts will differ from day to day and doctor to doctor.88
On a broad-based scale, the lack of uniformity that could occur in these
important decisions would foster piecemeal results. The development of
ethics committees could help solve this problem, .however, because such
committees may review decisions and offer structured guidance.87
Quinlan required the consultation of an ethics committee, even after
a joint decision by the family and attending physician to discontinue treat-
ment. The court supported its mandate by referring to an article by Dr.
Karen Teel, a physician." Teel called for an ethical rather than a technical
review of the decision to terminate treatment by a committee composed
of social workers, attorneys, physicians, theologians, and others.89 In con-
trast, the Quinlan court gave the committee the single task of confirm-
ing that there was "no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging
from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state."' The
hospital ethics committee was formed because staff and hospital ad-
ministrators perceived a need for a way to deal with perplexing internal
problems. 1 An ethics committee could be a weapon against the possibil-
ity of collusive manipulation by families and by physicians and may also
provide a "meaningful avenue" for patients and families to exercise their
rights.92
The inherent nature of a committee structure reduces the possibility
of collusion by doctors or families by serving as an additional internal
check within the decisionmaking process. 3 These committees allow much
needed dialogue, force an exploration of all the patient's options, diffuse
the responsibility for decisionmaking, and may eventually assume a legal
status that would lessen the concern for potential liability.' One com-
mentator has recognized many positive aspects of an ethics committee:95
" Baron, supra note 75, at 349-50.
" For a discussion of hospital ethics committees, see notes 88-101 & accompanying text
infra.
70 N.J. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668 (citing Teel, The Physician's Dilemma: A Doctor's View:
What the Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 6 (1975)).
11 Teel, supra note 88, at 8-9.
90 70 N.J. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671.
11 Levine, Hospital Ethics Committees: A Guarded Prognosis, HASTINGS CENTER REP.. June,
1977, at 25-26.
Id. at 27.
"3 Teel, supra note 88, at 9.
94 Id.
"s Buchanan, supra note 85, at 115.
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decisions would be subject to review and further investigation if commit-
tees were available, thereby producing more consistent decisions; such
decisions would also be supported by reasons and would be rendered more
quickly and economically than decisions by a judicial forum. Moreover,
people's moral opinions could be heard and responses elicited from within
the framework provided by an ethics committee. The major benefit is
seen as being the "restoration of a sense of shared responsibility for the
patient and family and, above all, the maximizing of support for the respon-
sible physician .... ," This benefit will insure the primary representation
of the patient's rights and will allow the balancing of other considerations.
Teel recognized that use of an ethics committee may also present some
difficulties, including opposition by many families and physicians to in-
trusion on their freedom to make independent judgments. 7 The court in
Saikewicz implicitly criticized Teel's approach because it thought the
Quinlan court had permitted the "ethics committee" to make legal deci-
sions as opposed to simply acting as a consultant. 8 It is also clear that
"committees are slow to act; [and] large hospitals may find it difficult
to assemble a readily available group .... 99
Despite its advocacy of the use of ethics committees, the Quinlan court
left unclear guidelines as to their proper role. Four possible tasks of the
committee are to review ethical and other values found in individual pa-
tient care decisions, to make more general ethical and policy decisions,
to counsel, and to make prognoses."' 0 With such a broad mandate, the
ethics committee as an institution may degenerate into an amorphous and
unwieldy body incapable of producing uniformity or being widely adopted.
An ethics committee could be valuable in the decisionmaking process, but
only when used in conjunction with physicians as decisionmakers. Ethics
committees could limit collusion, consider more factors, and eliminate a
technical monopoly held by physicians that may occur in certain cases.
Yet only if hospitals use such committees routinely can they supply a
stability useful in decisionmaking.10 '
Despite these shortcomings associated with the medical forum, having
doctors as decisionmakers for incompetent terminally ill patients' treat-
" Clinical Care Comm. of Mass. Gen. Hosp., Optimum Care for Hopelessly Ill Patients,
295 NEW ENG. J. MED. 362, 364 (1976).
Teel, supra note 88, at 9. See Sakiewicz, 373 Mass. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 434.
s Annas, supra note 3, at 381.
Note, supra note 12, at 170.
Veatch, Hospital Ethics Committees: Is There a Role?, HASTINGS CENTER REP.. June,
1977, at 22-24.
,o Many other questions have been raised concerning the procedural aspects of ethics
committees, including who should be on the committee, who should appoint the committee,
who should call the meeting, who should be the chairman, when the committee should meet,
when and how voting should be done, what should constitute a quorum or controlling ma-
jority vote, what notice requirements should be observed, and whether the incompetent
should have representation on the committee. Annas, supra note 3, at 385.
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ment offers many advantages. A decision by the attending physician ef-
fectively represents the patient's rights when the family's opinion and
the ethics committee's opinion are taken into consideration. The medical
forum can offer strong protection for an individual's rights.
THE JUDICIAL FORUM
A strong foundation also supports the proposition that courts are best
suited to serve as decisionmakers. Saikewicz supported the legal forum
approach, quoting Justice Cardozo's view on the necessary function of
the judiciary:
You may say that there is no assurance that judges will interpret
the mores of their day more wisely and truly than other men. I am
not disposed to deny this, but in my view it is quite beside the point.
The point is rather that this power of interpretation must be lodged
somewhere, and the custom of the constitution has lodged it in the
judges. If they are to fulfill their function as judges, it could hardly
be lodged elsewhere. 02
The basis for judicial decisionmaking rests on a "gradual development
of a body of common law principles, based in societal values, that can
be used for deciding fundamental questions with which a 'new technology'
is now challenging our society."''0 3 Courts have always been faced with
reconciling new facts with old principles. The judicial system is vitally
interested in defining and safeguarding the individual's and society's in-
terests and, as a result, may judge that the neutral presence of the law
is necessary to weigh such factors as the patient's wishes, the views of
the family, and the interests of society."4 The Eichner court made it clear
that the courts do not distrust doctors; the court must ultimately rely
on a physician's medical prognosis. 5 The judicial forum, therefore, does
not eliminate input by physicians; however, it refuses to rely solely on
the doctor's opinion.
There are advantages in allowing courts to decide when to discontinue
life-supporting treatment for incompetent terminally ill persons. The public
nature of judicial proceedings, the requirement that a judge's decision
be principled, the impartiality of the decisionmaker, and the adversary
nature of the judicial system are the main desired aspects furnished by
the legal forum.' Another positive feature is the factfinding process cen-
tral to the legal system. "[Tihe fact-finding process of a court is necessary
to protect society's interests in affording each of its members an impar-
1 73 A.D.2d at 453, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 535 (quoting B. CARDOZO. THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAI.
PROCESS 135-36 (1921)).
03 Baron, supra note 75, at 353.
04 73 A.D.2d at 475, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
105 Id.
'" Baron, supra note 75, at 347-49.
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tial determination of his best interests, when he is incapable of making
that determination on his own.""' Courts can provide a forum where dif-
ferent groups are able to coordinate their concerns and their input of
information.' 8 Of course, courts must rely on the medical profession in
deciding the medical aspects of a problem and are not ignorant of or in-
sensitive to the expertise and needs of the medical community on various
intersecting issues.0 9 The judicial forum remains necessary because "ques-
tions of life and death... require the process of detached but passionate
investigation and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch
was created.""10
Without court involvement, it is possible that the patient would not
have a representative; the adversary system provides this. A guardian
ad litem"' can insure that the patient will have vigorous representation.
Courts, as referees within an adversary system, are impartial by design"2
and because of this characteristic are able to exclude from the decision-
making process criteria that should not be considered. In Saikewicz, for
example, the court made clear that the patient's life will not be viewed
" Kindregan, supra note 47, at 933. But see, e.g., Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Pro-
cedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541, 563 (adversarial system should consist of two-tiered procedure;
first stage would resolve questions of fact with objective of determining truth; second would
resolve questions of policy in separate procedure).
"' Note, supra note 12, at 163.
"9 Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 475, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 549-50 (1980).
", Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 759, 370
N.E.2d 417, 435 (1977).
"' Kindregan, supra note 47, at 929 ("Although a high standard of proof is required of
the plaintiff, our present procedures do not insure an adversary process"). The importance
of the role of a guardian ad litem was recognized by the Saikewicz court: he will represent
the interests of the person he is appointed to represent and is charged with an additional
responsibility if there is a finding of incompetency. This responsibility is to present to
the judge all reasonable arguments in favor of administering treatment to prolong the
life of the individual involved. 373 Mass. at 756-57, 370 N.E.2d at 433-34. The court thought
that this insured that all viewpoints and alternatives would be considered, and assured
objectivity and fairness in the administration of cases. Id. "The hardest question is whether
a guardian can assume a modicum of altruism on the part of a patient even in the absence
of previously expressed concern for survivors' interests" Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy, and
the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 243,260 (1977). Certain prob-
lems are evident in the use of guardians ad litem. Courts neither require that a guardian
be appointed in each case nor offer guidance as to when such an appointment is necessary
or desirable. The adversarial nature of the judicial process may also be lacking when the
guardian ad litem is on the same side as those who initiated the proceedings. Baron, Assur-
ing "Detached but Passionate Investigation and Decision": The Role of Guardians Ad Lite
in Saikewicz-type Cases, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 111, 119-21 (1979). The court speaks of the guard-
ian arguing for treatment, but says nothing about arguing against treatment. Appoint-
ment of a guardian may be meaningless because there is no visible guarantee that a guard-
ian, when weighing what is in the best interests of the patient, will consider viewpoints
other than continuing treatment. Id.
' Only facts which are made relevant by the legal principles to be applied may
be considered by the court in reaching a decision.... Of course, judges are
human, so the law prefers relying on more than the judge's self-control to
eliminate consideration of prejudicial irrelevancies. First it attempts to assure
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in utilitarian terms because "the chance of a longer life carries the same
weight for Saikewicz as for any other person, the value of life under the
law having no relation to intelligence or social position." ' The court
system assures that other impermissible factors, such as hospital expenses,
need for hospital beds, or the inconvenience of treating a terminally ill
patient will not be controlling considerations in determining whether to
treat a patient.'
The courts also can balance the countervailing interests between the
patient and the state. The patient's constitutional rights may be weighed
against the interest of the state in prolonging life." 5 One of the state's
interests is in "maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profes-
sion by protecting physicians against the compelled violation of their pro-
fessional standards and against exposure to the risk of civil or criminal
liability.""' 6 This state interest may be accommodated by choosing the
legal forum as the decisionmaker. As one commentator has stated: "[T]he
court is not chosen as the forum because judges are wiser than other
men. Rather, the court is the forum because only the judges can provide
civil and criminal immunity to the person who withholds treatment.""' 7
Even if the court does not provide immunity, it can provide the most
reliable guidelines to inform physicians of the risk of civil or criminal
liability.
Another attractive feature of the judicial forum is the substitute judg-
ment standard used to protect an individual's rights. The standard gives
paramount importance to the rights of the incompetent patient, and courts
following the Saikewicz reasoning have all praised it."' The court is re-
quired by the doctrine "to substitute itself as nearly as may be for the
incompetent, and to act upon the same motives and considerations as
to the parties a trier of fact who knows as little as possible about the case
in advance of trial. Second, at trial, through the rules of evidence, it attempts
to keep the trier of fact from learning anything which might be persuasive
on grounds of prejudice (that is, reasons which are not relevant under the
legal principle) rather than on grounds which are relevant to the legal princi-
ple involved.
Baron, supra note 75, at 348 (footnotes omitted).
' 373 Mass. at 753, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
.. Note, supra note 12, at 163.
. Brant, The Right to Die in Peace: Substituted Consent and the Mentally Incompetent,
11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 959 (1977). Brant proposes a "rational calculus" which would recognize
that the state's interest in prolonging life diminishes as the prognosis approaches the in-
curable and the prospects for even temporary extension are poor, while the individual's
interest in bodily privacy increases with the severity of the treatment and its impact upon
the character of his life. Id. at 973.
. 73 A.D.2d at 456, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 537.
'" Kindregan, supra note 47, at 919-20.
"' The doctrine of substitute judgment in its "original inception called on the court to
'don the mental mantle of the incompetent.'" 373 Mass. at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 431, (quoting
In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 545, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962)). The doctrine
was first used to aid in the administration of the estate of an incompetent person. See
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would have moved [the patient].""' 9 The original purpose of the doctrine
of substitute judgment was to maintain the integrity of the incompetent
person, and the doctrine still possesses merit "because of its straightfor-
ward respect for the integrity and autonomy of the individual."'1 The
guardian and judge are both to be guided by this test, 2' which insures
that the wishes of the patient will be respected and that only those fac-
tors relating to what decision the incompetent would have made if com-
petent will be taken into account.
The judicial system, however, also possesses weaknesses as a decision-
maker. The judicial model avoids medical paternalism, but at the price
of legal imperialism, which may be defined as "any position that extends
the domain of the legal process beyond its proper boundaries, unjustifiably
encroaching on other, nonlegal spheres of decision making."'" A judicial
decision may thus be seen as failing to take seriously the unique moral
relation existing between the incompetent patient and his family.'" The
legal system is also subject to some of the same criticisms as the medical
forum, such as a lack of consistency124 and the inability of a court to know
enough of a patient's relevant characteristics to make a decision identical
to the one he would have made were he competent.' One critic has stated
that routine judicialization also intrudes on sound medical practice.' 26 The
courts cannot be expected to make sound judgments when "the moral
issues are so intertwined with complex medical considerations, nor can
they act promptly and flexibly enough to meet the rapidly changing needs
of clinical situations."'" Courts try to carry out objective standards, but
it is not clear that they "refrain from making their own subjective value
judgments.""8 The promise of judicial safeguards must also be qualified
because of the impossibility of avoiding collusive lawsuits by families and
physicians," which cannot always be discovered in order to prevent them.
Further problems in the judicial process include the large potential case
load,13 which leads to delay, and the high costs involved. These factors
Ex parte Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816). The substitute judgment test was subse-
quently used in situations involving medical treatment for incompetents. See Superinten-
dent of Belchertown State Schools v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). Ac-
cord, Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
"I City Bank v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594, 599 (1945).
373 Mass. at 751, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
"' For a discussion of the substitute judgment test, see text accompanying note 145 infra.
'= Buchanan, supra note 85, at 110.
Id. at 112.
12, See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
12 See text accompanying notes 80-81 supra.
126 See Relman, supra note 12, at 235-36.
" Id. at 240.
125 Note, supra note 12, at 164.
' Baron, supra note 111, at 117.
,' See Relman, supra note 12, at 241.
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could result in "closet" decisions'31 and a reluctance by both relatives and
physicians to take a case to court, since they trust the medical decision
and want to avoid expenses.'32 Two kinds of costs are incurred: those in-
curred by participants in the hearing process, and those incurred by the
court system.'" Father Eichner, the patient's guardian in Eichner v. Dillon,
commented on the costs incurred because of hospitalization and litigation
and wrote that the result of the litigation in that case was "a lawyers'
paradise, not to mention a doctors' bonanza .... While this may be fine
law ..... it certainly is not true justice.""'
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
Each of the possible alternatives has distinct advantages and disad-
vantages of differing degrees, and no solution will be without problems.
The recent case In re Spring3 ' suggests a starting point by attempting
to incorporate the best of each alternative. Spring sets the groundwork
for a solution that will allow doctors to make decisions with the family's
concurrence in some factual situations and will require courts to be deci-
sionmakers under other circumstances. This solution will also enable other
approaches, such as hospital ethics committees and guardians ad litem,
to develop more fully, in order to deal with the problems that undermine
their potential to contribute to the representation of incompetent termi-
nally ill patients' rights.
The proposed solution consists of two main parts. One method of
deciding right-to-die cases is to defer to the unanimous decision of doc-
tors regarding the incompetent patient's treatment, if it is not in conflict
with the wishes of the family. Spring stated that the court did not want
its previous decisions to be taken as establishing a uniform requirement
of prior judicial approval for discontinuing treatment. 6 The court gave
some guidelines indicating when prior judicial approval would be
necessary, but did not specify what combination of factors would require
application for a prior court order. This allows physicians some discre-
tion to make a decision, but the propriety of the decision will vary with
different fact situations. As the Spring court stated, "[s]ince the scien-
tific underpinnings of medical practice and opinion are in a constant state
of development, our opinion as to a particular set of facts may not be
a reliable guide to the proper solution of a future medical problem.""
13 Id. "Closet" decisions are decisions made by the physician, family, or both without
discussion or legal approval. Id.
1 See id.
' See Baron, supra note 75, at 358.
'3 Paris, supra note 40, at 877.
-___ Mass. -, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
'3 Id. at __, 405 N.E.2d at 120.
Id. at -' 405 N.E.2d at 121.
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The reluctance of the court to assign a rule to any set of facts thus rested
on the very pragmatic realization that future medical developments might
very well render the rule obsolete, and its wisdom questionable. This
reason for the court's caution, however, does not suggest that doctors,
with the concurrence of families, may not act when there is no dispute
regarding medical prognosis, and no difference of medical opinion regard-
ing treatment. Allowing doctors to act under such circumstances would
solve many problems. The painful prolonging of a situation involving an
incompetent terminally ill person that may result from resorting to the
legal system would be eliminated. Frequently, doctors do not make a deci-
sion alone; the concurrence of either another physician or an ethics com-
mittee is usually involved in the process. Such mechanisms also allow
the family to play a role in the decision. The chance of collusion would
be minimized as the two groups, families and physicians, could provide
a system of checks and balances, with the opportunity to resort to the
legal system if any conflict arose.
Dinnerstein could also be applied if the Spring opinion is followed.
Spring did not comment extensively on the holding in Dinnerstein, but
stated that it was consistent with Saikewicz.1 The Saikewicz line of cases
illustrated that it is necessary to distinguish the facts of each case. The
important distinction in Dinnerstein was between treatment which aims
for a temporary or permanent cure and treatment which merely seeks
to delay imminent and inevitable death. Dinnerstein concluded that if the
treatment is neither life-saving nor life-prolonging,"9 but is only meant
to delay impending death, then the treatment decision may be made
without a court proceeding. The court narrowly held that a case that
presented the question of "what measures are appropriate to ease the
imminent passing of an irreversibly, terminally ill patient in light of the
patient's history and condition and the wishes of her family" is one within
the competence of the medical profession.4 0 The Dinnerstein decision
stated that the facts of that case did not present a "significant treatment
choice or election" subject to judicial scrutiny because "[a]ttempts to apply
resuscitation, if successful, will do nothing to cure or relieve the illnesses
which will have brought the patient to the threshold of death."'' Although
there are still questions left unanswered after Dinnerstein, many of them
can be answered, and Dinnerstein does offer a solution to specific deci-
sionmaking problems.' The incompetent patient will have his rights pro-
,' Id. at -, 405 N.E.2d at 120.
Dinnerstein interpreted the terms "life-saving" and "life-prolonging," used in the
Saikewicz opinion, as referring to treatment which seeks a result beyond "a mere suspen-
sion of the act of dying." 6 Mass. App. Ct. at 472-73, 380 N.E.2d at 137-38.
"o Id. at 472-73, 380 N.E.2d at 139.
Id.
"4 See Schram, Kane & Roble, "No-Code" Orders: Clarification in the Aftermath of
Saikewicz, 299 NEw ENG. J. MED. 875, 876-77 (1978).
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tected because no-code orders are only issued after a detailed medical
evaluation that considers whether the patient's condition is irreversible,
irreparable, and imminently fatal. 4'
The protection of a patient's rights and the representation of an in-
competent person can thus both be achieved if the physician and family
are given decisionmaking authority. If there is any possibility, however,
that the incompetent's rights are being violated, then the legal system
is a necessary alternative. The Spring court admonished that "private
medical decisions must be made responsibly, subject to judicial scrutiny
if good faith or due care is brought into question in subsequent
litigation.""' The family or a hospital ethics committee could raise the
issue of whether a medical decision was made responsibly.
When a question dealing with the termination of an incompetent ter-
minally ill patient's life arises, the courts have applied the substitute judg-
ment doctrine, following Saikeucz. The precise definition of what it means
to choose what the incompetent would do if competent is unclear. One
commentator sees substitute judgment as combining subjective and ob-
jective elements:
The subjective elements are the present tastes and preferences of
the incompetent and those which he might have if competent, if he
has a reasonable chance of becoming so. The objective aspect is the
determination of what a reasonable person with the characteristics
and present and future wants of the incompetent would choose to max-
imize his interests.145
Viewed in a skeptical light, the application of the substitute judgment
doctrine may allow courts to impose their own subjective view on what
the patient would desire. Yet the principle behind the doctrine is
commendable 146 and when properly used will protect the patient's rights.
The application of the doctrine of substitute judgment by Saikewicz and
its progeny becomes, in reality, a weighing of different interests. The
courts use the doctrine to try to ascertain the incompetent patient's own
wishes through available evidence and by asking what a reasonable per-
son in the patient's particular factual situation would wish to do. Substitute
judgment, as used by the Massachusetts courts, attempts to determine
what a patient would choose, while protecting his rights and insuring that
improper considerations, such as financial concerns or collusive motives,
do not enter into the decision. This test is a more formal version of the
subjective decisionmaking processes that physicians, families, and ethics
committees also go through.
The guidelines presented in the Massachusetts line of cases and others
See 6 Mass. App. Ct. at 475, 380 N.E.2d at 139.
- Mass. at __, 405 N.E.2d at 122.
'" Robertson, supra note 43, at 68.
.46 See Robertson, supra note 43, at 62. See also Kindregan, supra note 46.
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that have followed Saikewicz provide the courts with an opportunity to
create uniformity. The judicial system is a powerful safeguard for the
rights of the incompetent individual because decisions can be reviewed
and are subject to the scrutiny of the public. The impartiality and fairness
inherent within the legal system14 7 and its ability to give a doctor's deci-
sion immunity recommend it as the final decisionmaker whenever con-
flicts arise which threaten the rights of an incompetent patient.
The main hurdles to be overcome within the judicial system are the
problems of cost and delay. Each of these problems may be exacerbated
due to the potentially great number of cases which may arise. If physi-
cians are free to make decisions with the concurrence of families and/or
hospital ethics committees, the potential case load will be smaller because
the need for judicial intervention will be lessened.148
CONCLUSION
The chief concern regarding who should have the responsibility to decide
when to terminate the life of an incompetent terminally ill patient is ade-
quate protection of the patient's rights. In re Spring, the most recent
opinion in the line of decisions following Saikewicz, offers groundwork
for the answer to the question "Who decides?." Spring recognizes that
factual differences among cases dictate different solutions. Medical prac-
titioners frequently must deal. with the question of when to terminate
treatment for an incompetent terminally ill patient and can often deal
properly with the problem. The rapid growth of medical technology
prevents the court from providing specific guidelines for the physician
and other decisionmakers. The freedom granted in Spring is at least a
tentative solution to the multifaceted problem of "Who decides?."
Judicialization also provides a forum for answering the difficult ques-
tion involved in decisionmaking and offers a method to assert an incompe-
tent patient's rights. The substitute judgment test used by the court is
a means for weighing different considerations involved in each factual
situation and for upholding a patient's rights in the best possible man-
ner. The judicial system can also provide continuing guidelines over time.
At first glance, it may appear that the growth of cases concluding with
Spring has circled back to that deference toward medical decisionmaking
which prevailed before any court involvement. This ironic perspective
is fallacious as many changes have evolved because of judicialization.
Judicial decisions have established a method of analysis that primarily
focuses on the preservation of a patient's rights. As a result, more cer-
tainty regarding the extent of a physician's immunity from criminal and
.. See text accompanying notes 112-15 supra.
14 8 Mass. at -, 405 N.E.2d at 123-24.
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civil liability now exists. Decisions are less hampered by the self-defensive
concerns of doctors, and the compromise solution as proposed by this note
is more desirable and workable. Doctors and families should decide
whether to terminate treatment without prior judicial approval when the
decision is unanimous; such a process will be more expeditious than judicial
proceedings and will be as able as a court to fit the particular facts of
any case to a decision corresponding to what the patient would have
wanted. The judicial system in cases of disagreement or uncertainty will
then insure the availability of fairness to the incompetent. The solution
proposed here achieves the best utilization of the qualities of each forum,
leading to a more certain protection of the rights of incompetent terminally
ill patients. The importance placed on guarding an individual's rights by
the proposed solution may also provide a strong guiding emphasis for
legislators should they decide to act upon this issue.
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